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DISMISSALS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FOR PETITIONING
CONGRESS: ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINE.AND 5 U.S.C.
SECTION- 652(d)
A recent per curiam decision by- the -Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia '-has focused attention on, but failed to resolve, important questions
concerning a seldom-used statute bearing on the relationship between bureau-
cratic discipline and the first amendment rights of federal employees. The
obscure statutory provision involved is 5 U.S.C. section 652(d), which pro-
vides that':-
The right of persons employed in the civil, service of the United States,
either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any Member
thereof, or to furnish information to either House of Congress, or, to
any Committee or member thereof, shall not be denied' or interfered
with.
2
Turner, an FBI agent with ten years' experience, was dismissed from the
Bureau in June, 1961. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission, the FBI
advanced a variety of reasons for Turner's dismissal. The Commission, how-
ever, .relied only upon statements made by Turner in letters to Senators Ie-
fauver and Javits and- to Representative Celleri in upholding the dismissal.8
These letters were written after Turner had been placed on indefinite pro-
bation and suspended by J. Edgar Hoover for "apparently . . . placing . . .
personal preferences and conveniences [With respect to assignments and
transfers], above the welfare and needs of the F.B.I."4 Turner's letters con-
sisted of a refutation of these charges,5 an affirmative attack on FBI policy
1. Turner v. Kennedy, Civil Action No. 3160-62, D.D.C., October 5, 1962, aff'd per
curiam, 332 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 33 U.S. L. WEax 3171 (1964). Apparently
certiorari was denied because counsel for Turner filed their petition one day after the
statutory allowance had passed. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c). See Memo for Respondent Against
Petition for Certiorari.
2. 62"Stat. 356 (1948).
3. The Civil Service Commission action is recorded in two sections: the Appeals
Examining Office Report appears in the document submitted to the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit entitled "Pertinent Portions of Adminis-
trative Record Designated by Appellees" [hereinafter cited as REcoRD], pp. 24-41; the
opinion of the Board of Appeals and Review is set out at Rncopn at 42-44.
The charges made by J. Edgar Hoover included items outside of the letters, but these
were not accepted or relied on by the Civil Service Commission in its decisions. Mr.
Hoover's charges are reprinted as Exhibit A in Joint Appendix of Brief for Appellant
[hereinafter cited as APPENDIx], pp. 10-19, and are also included in RacoRw at 1-7.
4. APPENDIX at 11 (referred to in letter from Mr. Hoover to Turner). Turner was
notified of the suspension in December, 1960. See his letter to Senator Kefauver of
April 30, 1961, REcoRD at 9.
5. See, e.g., letter to Sen. Kefauver, REcoa, at 8-10; letter to Rep. Celler, REcoan at
14-16.
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and morale,6 and a plea to Congress to take action to reinstate him and to
reform FBI personnel practices.7 The FBI charged that certain statements
in Turner's letters were "false, untrue or made irresponsibly."3 The hearing
examiner applied a somewhat different test in upholding the FBI charges:
whether Turner's statements were made "without reasonable basis of belief."*
A second FBI charge - that Turner had demonstrated a lack of loyalty and
respect - was sustained on the basis of a statement in one of Turner's letters
adverting to the prevalence of the "Hoover myth" and to current criticism of
the Bureau. ° The examiner concluded that Turner had placed himself in a
position "where he could no longer effectively serve as a member of the organ-
ization."-
Afirming this decision, the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil
Service Commission discussed the applicability of 5 U.S.C. section 652(d).
The Board held that the statute did not create an absolute right to petition
Congress: rather, the statutory right may be lost if:
(1) the employee's conduct constituted an abuse of the right and went
beyond the scope of permissible activity contemplated by the Congress
in enacting this legislation, and (2) thereby caused the agency immediate
and substantial harm.12
While the Board held that Turner had "lost" his right to protection under
section 652(d), it is not clear what standard it applied. Language in the opinion
indicated that findings of both falsity and irresponsibility were necessary to
6. See, e.g., letter to Ser. Kefauver, RECORD at 10-12; letter to Rep. Celler, REcoRD
at 16.
7. See. e.g., letter to Sen. Kefauver, REcoRD at 12; letter to Rep. Celler, REcoRD at 17.
Specifically, Turner alleged that: (1) retaliation had been taken because of his request for
a thansfer; (2) the Bureau had failed to make use of his technical qualifications in assign-
ing him to a "permanent road trip"; (3) an inspector had been sent to discredit him rather
than to conduct an impartial investigation into his claims; (4) a memorandum relating
to his work performance was missing from the files; (5) his supervisor vas absent from
work; and (6y "morale in the FBI [was] at an all-time low." See letter to Sen. Kefauver,
REcoRD at 11, 8-10 (other charges) (on morale); letter to Rep. Celler, REcoa at 14-16.
8. -REcoan at 32 (Appeals Examining Office opinion).
9. REcoRa at 3Z
10. The charge appears as number 3, "poor attitude toward the FBI and its Director"
in Mr. Hoover's letter. AnPEaix at 15. In his letter to Sen. Kefauver, Mr. Turner .wote:
"It would appear that any statement not serving to perpetuate the Hoover myth is there-
fore an 'unfounded allegation." RECOaD at 10. The charge was sustained by the Commission,
REcoRD at 29-30.
11. RECORD at 40. The Ezzimining Office's opinion is ambiguous and confusing. It
noted that sanctions were not applied per se for the filing of a protest and that unless
slanderous matter, deliberate falsities, or obstinacy through reiteration of a matter finally
adjudicated were present, the filing of a grievance did "not constitute an actionable wrong."
Ibid. But these criteria were not applied - "deliberate falsity" was not found. Instead, the
evidence was held to support the charge of making "false, untrue statements" without
reference to Turner's knowledge. Ibid.
12. Id. at 43.
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sustain the dismissal.' 3 In other parts of the decision, however, the Board
implied that a finding of either component would be sufficient; thus the Board
upheld the lack of loyalty charge which had not been based on a demonstration
of falsity, 14 and the opinion in places referred to the components of falsity
and irresponsibility separately. 15
After the adverse determination before the Board, Turner brought an action
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, asking for a declaratory
judgment and an order for reinstatement.16 An important question was clearly
presented: what is the extent and content of the right of civil servants to
petition Congress assured by section 652(d) ? Despite this sharply focused
issue and the ambiguities of the Civil Service Commission's standards, both
the District Judge - who granted the government's motion for summary
judgment - and the Court of Appeals - which affirmed in a three-line
curiam opinion - failed to discuss the issue posed.17 This summary treat-
ment of the statutory interpretation problem is especially surprising in light
ef the fact that the only relevant decision under section 652(d), Steek v.
Connally,'8 had reached a result squarely contradicting the Civil Service
13. .. . [W]e are of the opinion that the writing of false and irresponsible statements
which either demonstrate the employee's unsuitability . . . or cause substantial harm
to his agency, deprives him of the statutory protection of 5 USC § 652(d).
RECORD at 44 (emphasis added).
14. RECORD at 43 (Board sustained charge Number 3). The Appeals Examining
Office's views upholding the charge of lack of loyalty are at Id. at 39. Mr. Hoover's details
on the charge are at Id. at 4-6. However, only item "C" relating to the "Hoover myth"
was sustained. Falsity was not alleged in item "C," only that Turner was "impertinent,
immature, indiscreet and . . . undesirab[le] ... as a Special Agent." Id. at 5.
15. The Board noted that if the statements were true, the conclusion would follow
that the FBI staff was dishonest and irresponsible; if false, Congress would be grossly
deceived; and
Certainly, statements of this kind, if false, are likely to impair the efficiency of
the agency. Moreover, the irresponsibility of the appellant in making such unjustified
statements would render him incapable of performing useful and efficient service
for the agency in the future. RECORD, p. 44 (emphasis added).
The Commission may have felt that the deceit of Congress and the impaired efficiency
of the agency caused by false statements would be enough to support dismissal without
a showing of irresponsibility.
16. The complaint, answer, motions for summary judgment and the order issued by
Judge Matthews are set forth in APPENDIX at 1-26.
17. The per curiam treatment creates additional problems. No finding was made
by the Appeals Examining Officer that Turner knew that his statements were untrue,
and the Board of Appeals and Review appears to have used a standard of "false and
irresponsible" statements. See note 13-15 supra and accompanying text. Yet the govern-
ment brief repeatedly stressed that the statements in the petition were knowhilny false,
Brief for Appellees, pp. 16, 29, 30, 35, and 36. Thus, it is impossible to tell what standard
was being approved by the summary decisions of the district and circuit courts.
18. 199 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1961). Other cases concerning rights of public em-
ployees were not so clearly applicable as Sleek. E.g., Eustace v. Day, 198 F. Supp. 233
(D.D.C. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 314 F2d 247 (D.C. Cir. 1962), upheld the dismissal of
a federal employee for distributing handbills denouncing his superiors. This was thought
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Commission's interpretation of section 652(d) in the Turner case. In Steck,
a 1961 decision, Judge Holtzoff granted summary judgment and ordered re-
instatement of a plaintiff civil servant who had been dismissed for circulating
a petition to Congress among his fellow employees. Judge Holtzoff held that
section 652(d) forbids censoring the contents of employee petitions and dis-
missals based on false statements contained in the petition. Even though the
activity may impair departmental morale, or otherwise interfere with the
smo~bth functioning of the bureaucratic machinery, the right to petition must
be upheld since the statutory language contained no limitation.19
In the Turner case, only Judge Fahy, who dissented from the Court of
Appeals' per curiam decision, considered the obvious issues raised. Citing
Steck with approval, judge Fahy examined the legislative history of section
652(d) and concluded that it was intended to encompass petitions arising from
work grievances. 20 This legislative background, and the relationship of the
provision to the first amendment right to petition indicated to Judge Fahy
that the exercise of the right to petition could not depend on a "subsequent
audit" showing that the statements were true, responsible and justified.2 He
urged that the statute be interpreted to incorporate a standard similar to that
established by the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , the
privilege of petitioning would be upheld unless the statements by the civil
service employee were made with "actual malice, that is, with knowledge that
they were false or with reckless disregard of whether false or not."' In his
view, the case should have been remanded to the Civil Service Commission
for consideration under this standard.
Given the extreme breadth of the statutory language, the obvious starting
point of an inquiry into the proper interpretation of Section 652(d) is its
legislative history. This section, originally part of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 1912,24 was specifically directed at the infamous "gag rule." As originally
instituted through an Executive Order by President Roosevelt in 1902, the
to be "external concerted activities" and not within the protection of § 652(c) Levine
v. Farley, 107 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940), noted that
§ 652 insulated the communications of grievances to public officials, but upheld a removal
based on the publication of a grievance in a newspaper. See also Keyton v. Anderson, 229
F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (dismissal for filing defamatory charges with superiors upheld).
19. 199 F. Supp. at 105. Judge Holtzoff indicated that some limitations might be
sustained - e.g., to check serious disruption of work by circulation of petitions during
working hours.
20. 332 F.2d at 306. In an earlier opinion Judge Fahy had indicated the potential
utility of a cognate section, 652(c). Eustace v. Day, 314 F.2d 247, 248 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(concurring opinion).
21. 332 F.2d at 307.
22. 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964).
23. 332 F.2d at 307.
24. Act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 555 (1912). Other provisions included an eight
hour day for postal carriers and the creation of postal savings depositories.
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gag rule absolutely barred employees of the executive department from pe-
titibning Congress to remedy job grievances:
All officers and employees of the United States are hereby forbidden,
either directly or indiretly, individually or through associations, to solicit
an increase of pay or to influence or attempt to influence in their own
interest any other legislation whatever either before Congress or its
Committees, or in any way save through the heads of the Departments
in or under which they serve, on penalty of dismissal from the Govern-
ment service.28
In 1909 President Taft issued a similar executive order which, although broadly
banning petitions seeking "congressional action of any kind," did permit em-
ployees to present petitions with the "consent and knowledge" of their de-
partment heads.26 The rationale of the gag rule was two-fold: it was designed
to preserve the executive's administrative prerogative over the federal bureau-
cracy - in order to promote discipline, efficiency and morale - and to curb
the growing political power of the civil servants as a special interest group.21
The gag rule immediately evoked severe criticism, especially from post office
employees, who comprised the largest number of civil servants affected, and
against whom the rule was strictly enforced. 28 In the context of these com-
plaints, and of growing legislative dissatisfaction with the gag rule,20 Congress
passed section 6 of the 1912 Act containing the exact language of the present
section 652 (d).80
25. Exec. Order No. 163, January 31, 1902, reprinted in 48 CoxG. REc. 5223 (1912).
Exec. Order No. 402, January 25, 1906, reprinted ibid., extended the gag rule's coverage
to include employees of "independent government establishments."
26. Exec. Order 1142, November 26, 1909, reprinted ibid. The Taft order also pro-
vided that no employee shall respond to any request for information from a Congressional
Committee or Member. Section 652(d) speaks to this problem as well as the right to
petition:
The right of persons employed in the civil service . . . to furnish information to
either House... or to any committe or member .. shall not be denied or Inter-
fered with.
For a recent application dealing with" confidential information, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 6,
1963, p. 1, col. 8, p. 20, col. 4.
27. See, e.g., 29 U.S. Cnnm SEavicE Comm. ANN. REP, 24 (1913); cf. 48 Coxa, Rc,
5235 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Buchanan).
28. See, e.g., 48 CoxG. REc. 5080 (i912) (remarks of Rep. Rouse); id. at 4653-54
(remarks of Rep. Calder); id. at 5626 (Order of Postmaster General Cortelyou, October
10, 1905).
29. In a last feeble attempt to forestall the anti-gag legislation, President Taft amended
the executive order two days before the 1912 bill reached the House floor. This version
provided that petitions were to be transmitted through the heads of departments " vho
shall forward them without delay with such comments as they may deem requisite .. ." to
Congress. Exec. Order No. 1514, April 8, 1912, reprinted in 48 CoNo. REc. 5223 (1912).
30. See the amendment offered by Sen. Reed extending the anti-gag provision to all
civil servants and the debate thereon, 48,CoxNG. Rsc. 10672-76 (1912) (especially remarks
of Sens. Reed, Bourne, and Warren). The Senate ignored the recommendation of its
Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads to; reject the'Ho'use'version of Section 6
which insured the right of postal employees to petition Congress. See S. REP. No. 955,
62d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1912) ; note 42 infra.
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The dominant theme in the House and Senate debates seems to have been
that the act was designed to insure that unjust treatment of government em-
ployees would promptly and effectively be brought to the attention of Congress.31
Many Congressmen felt that redress of job grievances could not be satisfactorily
obtained by employee appeals to superiors; the gag rule "instead of promoting
discipline and efficiency, produces the worst kind of tyranny" by department
heads.82 Moreover, the gag rule led to a general pressure for conformity which
sapped morale and resulted in resignations. s The most reliable source of
information about federal employment problems was being choked off, and
personnel difficulties were being hidden from Congressional view."
It is apparent, then, that section 652(d) was intended to encompass job
grievance petitions, It also seems clear that Congress meant to prevent the
act of petitioning from being used as grounds for discipline or dismissalVns A
more difficult question, and one on which the legislative history is more am-
biguous, is whether and-to what extent the contents of petitions may be used
by government departments to demonstrate the employee's unfitness for service.
Although Congress did not direct .its attention specifically to the question
of the degree to which contents of petitions by public employees would be
immunized from executive disciplinary action, the tenor of the debates points
toward wide protection of the contents of petitions. The Congressional re-
sponse to the gag rule was impassioned, and sweeping language vas used to
31. See, e.g., 48 CoNG. Rm. 4653-54 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Calder) ; id. at 10671.
(remarks of Sen. Martine) ; see also id. at 5000 (remarks of Rep. Austin).
32. 48 Co-G. REC. 5207 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Konop),; see also id. at 4513 (re-
.marksof Rep. .Gregg)-:- -
If he appealed to one of the heads of the department, that particular officer sent
it back to the postmaster or the head of his division. The result was that forever
thereafter this particular employee enjoyed the ill will of his immediate superior
.. ; It [the gag rule] is responsible, for the discontent that exists among all of
the postal employees of the Nation ....
See also id. at 5223- (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy).
33. -See, e.g., 48 CoNG. REC. 5157 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Evans); id. at 5223 (re-
marks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); id.; at 4656 (remarks of Rep. Reilly): "[The gag rule]
has prevented them -[the postal employees] from uttering any word of complaint even
against the most outrageous treatment that could be heaped upon them."
-34. See 48 CONG. Rec. 4653 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Calder):
.4. I was desirous of learning the needs of the postal service and inquiring into
the conditions of the employees. To my surprise I found that under an Executive
order these... employees could not give me any information and always referred
me to the postmaster . :... IThe order] should be abrogted .... (S]urely if
any man is competent to express an opinion regarding the needs of the postal
service it is the men who, perform the actual work. , ...
See also Id. at 5634 (remarks- of Rep. Lloyd, the bilPs sponsor); id. at 10673 (remarks
of Sen. Reed); Appendix to 48 CONG. Rac 140 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Stone).
5 35' This much, appears- to have been conceded, by the government in Turner. See
Brief for Appellees, pp. 20, 33. See also 62,Stat. 356 (1948), 5 U.S.C. § 652(c) (1958):
'the -presenting . .: of any .. revane.(by postal organization members) ...shall not
constitute or- be cause for reductionin rank or compensation or removal .... [Emphasis
added.]
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indicate the scope of employee rights that were to be created by the new
statute.36 Only one speaker during the lengthy debates indicated that the
statute might permit any disciplinary action based on the contents of the
petitions: Representative Reilly suggested that employees "would have to
assume the responsibility for their acts in the event of making false or mis-
leading charges that could not be borne out by evidence on investigation." 1
Congressional intent to grant the contents of petitions broad protection from
executive review may also be indicated by the numerous references made to
the statute as restoring the First Amendment rights of speech and petition
held by workers before the gag rule,38 and as placing government employees
on equal footing with other citizens in their ability to air their grievances to
Congress without fear of reprisal.2 9 The legislators' comments on the Con-
stitution are not free from ambiguity, however. Many of these comments can
be discounted as rhetorical flag-waving.40 It is difficult to tell, moreover,
whether some remarks were denunciations of the gag rule as unconstitutional
or descriptions of rights guaranteed by the new statute.41 Nor did any of the
legislators advert to the applicability of the then prevalent "privilege" doctrine
- that since government employment was a mere privilege rather than a
right, it might be conditioned in any way, and that employees who asserted
their right to petition Congress might be sanctioned by the executive without
36. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REc. 4738 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Blacknon); id. at 5223
(remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy) :
Recognizing the right of every citizen to free speech and to petition Congress, this
Democratic House glories in the reiteration of the principle contained in the ...
Constitution . . ., and by this legislation we strike from the enslaved employees all
letters and restrictions, thus restoring them to an atmosphere of liberty and freedom
and rescuing them from the suffocating confines of departmental despotism. ([Empha-
sis added.]
See also id. at 4513 (remarks of Rep. Gregg) ; id. at 4653-54 (remarks of Rep. Calder);
id. at 5207 (remarks of Rep. Konop).
37. 48 CONG. REc. 4656 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Reilly). Earlier in the same speech,
however, Rep. Reilly had noted: "lilt is high time that Congress should listen to the
appeals of these men and provide a way whereby they can properly present a petition
to the Members of Congress for a redress of grievances without the lear of losing their
official positions." Id. (Emphasis added).
38. See e.g., 48 CONG. REc. 4656-57 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Reilly on restoring
"rights .. . taken away") ; id. at 5201-02 (remarks of Rep. Prouty on "restoring" rights
clearly guaranteed by the Constitution) ; id. at 4739 (remarks of Rep. Blackmon) ; id, at
10673 (remarks of Sen. Reed).
39. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REc. 5080 (remarks of Rep. Rouse); id. at 10803 (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
40. See, e.g., 48 CONG. REc. 5626 (remarks of Rep. Fowler):
This "gag rule" is a wild onion from the executive department, with the stencil
of its odor trying to establish itself in the fertile soil of legislative dominion, Let
us pull it up by the roots and destroy it in the fire of our zeal and love for the
Constitution as it came from the righteous hands of our forefathers.
41. See, e.g., 48 CoNG. REc. 5223 (1912) (remarks of Rep. O'Shaunessy); Id. at 5501
(remarks of Rep. Finley); Appendix to 48 CONG. REc. 160 (1912) (remarks of Rep.
Maguire).
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raising a constitutional question.4 On balance, it is doubtful that these refer-
ences to the Constitution in the debate meant that Congress intended in any
systematic fashion to engraft a first amendment standard on the statute. But
they do indicate a concern with the constitutional dimension, and a feeling
that the right to petition should be accorded substantial protection. In sum,
although the desire of Congress to grant broad protection to government em-
ployees is clear, the legislative history does not fill in the exact contents of
the statute, leaving to the courts the task of developing the precise measure
of the right to petition afforded by section 652(d).
In developing criteria for the application of Section 652(d), a court should
be aware of the difficult set of constitutional problems that may be created
if the statutory right to petition is construed narrowly. This is not to say
that section 652(d), which grants a statutory right to petition and does not
purport to be the exclusive source of rights to petition, would be unconstitu-
tional if narrowly construed.4 3 If the congressional grant affords less protection
42. The Senate Committee report recommending that the section be scrapped, main-
tained that the federal employee already had a constitutional right, as did any citizen,
to appear before Congress on matters of public concern; but that job grievance petitions
were beyond the pale of constitutional protection and undeserving of statutory protection:
[A]lI citizens have a constitutional right as such to present their grievances to
Congress ... But Governmental employees occupy a position relative to the Gov-
ernment different from that of ordinary citizens. Upon questions of interest to
them as citizens, governmental employees have a right to petition Congress direct.
A different rule should prevail with regard to their presentation of grievances
connected with their relation to the Government as employees. In that respect good
discipline and the efficiency of the service require that they present their grievances
through the proper administrative channels.
S. RFe. No. 955, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1912).
The rejection of the Committee's recommendations, combined with the references in de-
bate to the re-establishment of constitutional rights, might be taken as an indication that
Congress thought job grievances to be constitutionally protected. That this was Congress's
view, however, appears doubtful when the state of constitutional doctrine in 1912 is con-
sidered. It had frequently been held that government employees were not free to exercise
their constitutional rights without imperilling their positions; government employment,
in short, was a "privilege" and not a "right." See, e.g., McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155
Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), for Mir. Justice Holmes' (then Judge) famous remark
that while the policeman has a right to free speech, he has no right to be a policeman;
Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) - especially Justice Bradley's dissent, id. at 376.
The general view of the time may be seen in Catherwood, Political Activity by Civil Service
Employees, 7 ILL. L. Ray. 160 (1912); 29 U.S. CrVIL SmEvxcE Comt. Aim. REP. 23-24
(1913). See generally, Nelson, Public Employees and the Right to Engage in Political
Activity, 9 VAND. L. REv. 27, 38-42 (1955). Some legislators may have intended an aban-
donment of the "privilege" doctrine without referring to it by that name. See, e.g., 48
CONG. REc. 4657 (1912) (remarks of Rep. Reilly):
Let us lift this ban from around the necks of these men and take the gag out of
their mouths and give them the assurance that the fact of their accepting a position
in the Government service will not disbar them from presenting their proper
petitions to Congress.
See also id. at 10803 (remarks of Sen. Williams) ; id. at 5235 (remarks of Rep. Buchanan).
43. The statute, being permissive, might be of little utility if it did not grant at
least as much protection as the Constitution, but it would still be constitutional.
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to the contents of petitions than does the Constitution, the employee can
always fall back upon his first amendment rights. Thus, the more restrictive
the reading of section 652(d), the greater the likelihood will be that employees
who are unprotected by the statute will claim that the first amendment im-
munizes them from executive discipline based on the contents of their petitions.
A myriad of difficult constitutional questions would then arise: Does the first
amendment extend to job grievance petitions by federal employees?" Assuming
that it does, are petitioners absolutely protected from executive discipline, or
is the constitutional right more limited?.5 Does the "privilege" doctrine apply,
or is there a "right" to government employment which cannot be jeopardized
by.exercise of the first amendment right to petition?" These intricate constitu-
44. Historically, the right to petition has expanded. At first limited to complaints
for redress of grievances, it has grown to encompass petitions on general measures of
public policy. CoRwix, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 203-04 (Atheneum
ed. 1963); "Petition," 17 ENCYCLOPEDIA BrrricACA 648-49 (1957). It could be argued
that job complaints of public employees fall within the realm of "public" matters, and are
related to an area over which Congress may legislate and investigate. Thus, job grievance
petitions may be within the cognizance of the first amendment.
45. The limits on the constitutional right to petition have never clearly been spelled
out. The sparse historical data available indicates that the petitioner was largely immunized
from punishment, but not if the statements were made maliciously or contained scurrilous
or libellous matter. See 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTTUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 1895 n. 2 (4th ed. 1873); Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. R. 508, 526-30 (N.Y.
1809) and note 51 infra. See also, COLTON, THE RIGHT TO PTIToN (1840), a pamphlet
published as a result of the debates on the refusal of the House of Representatives to en-
tertain abolition petitions. Colton points out the difficulties in determining the meaning
of "right to petition," deciding that it is an "unalienable and indefeasible" right which
existed before the Constitution was adopted:
It lies further back, has a deeper foundation; and the doctrine of the Constitution
would seem to be, that it cannot be abrogated, or impaired by human legislation or
authority.
Id. at 3.
As to balances and checks on the right of petition, Colton notes that unrestricted
freedom has been the "general practice" concerning petitions, and that the right means
"simply, that the petitioners shall not be molested by the Government in their own courge
of action." Id. at 10. "[A] people, in the exercise of political rights, such as the right of
petition, cannot be sued at common law, nor arraigned under any code of statutes before
a judiciary." Id. at 4. Colton thought the chief check on abuse was the political process,
not legal remedies. Id. at 4. In his view, the discretion and conscience of the authorities
addressed would minimize abuses of the right to petition. Id. at 4, 8. His conclusion was
that Congress had not abridged the right of petition by not receiving the abolition pe-
titions: it was protecting itself against insult, absurd proposals and the unconstitutionality
of the action the petitioners proposed. In addition, Congress was insuring its own inde-
pendence from unruly "popular impulses." Id. at 10-12, 14-16. Cf. SLADE, SPEECH ON THE
RIGHT OF PErmoN, 5-7 (1840) .(pamphlet of speech in House of Representatives, Jan.
18,20, 1840).
46. The state of the law on the inter-relationships among the privilege, the Constitution
and public employment is confused and unsatisfactory. Compare Slochower v. Board of
Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956), with Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952),
and Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). See also Bailey v. Richardgon,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), afl'd by an equally, divided Cotit, 341 U.S. 918 (1951);
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tional questions are made more difficult by the absence of precedent concerning
the content and extent of the constitutional right to petition. Because the right
has been infrequently asserted in judicial proceedings and because of its di-
minished importance as a mode of communicating political problems to Con-
gress, courts and commentators have not had the occasion nor felt the need
to articulate the principles underlying this right.47
A generous interpretation of the statutory right to petition would enable
a court to avoid this difficult and unwelcome task of defining the content of
the constitutionally guaranteed right to petition. If the statutory right is in-
terpreted to be coextensive with, or greater than, the first amendment right,
it would be unnecessary for the court to face the more delicate problem of
articulating constitutional doctrine in this uncharted first amendment area.
The doctrine of avoidance of unnecessary constitutional decisions seems par-
ticularly appropriate in developing standards under section 652(d). By post-
poning the constitutional adjudication a court will allow accumulation of knowl-
edge and experience concerning government employees' right to petition which
should help to illuminate the ultimate constitutional issue. Moreover, a statu-
tory decision will allow Congress to readjust the relationship between the
employee, his executive superiors and Congress itself, whereas a constitutional
decision would rigidify the interrelationships and would preclude legislative
action responsive to future needs and developments.
In order to develop standards under section 652(d) which will be co-ex-
tensive with or greater than the protection which may be afforded by the
Constitution, some estimate of the potential constitutional guarantee is neces-
sary. This process is made difficult by the dearth of case material on the con-
stitutional right to petition. However, the recent landmark decision of the
Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 48 provides an instructive
analogy which may help in the estimation of the constitutional right to petition.
In that case the Court held that the first amendment barred a libel suit against
a newspaper based on non-malicious criticism of public officiasYO The relevance
of the New York Times case to the right of petition stems initially from the
fact that job grievance petitions will most often involve criticism of public
officials and executive department policy. In addition, the press and other
modem communications media have assumed many of the functions historically
associated with petitions to the legislature: informing the legislature of abuses
Washington v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 964 (D.C.C. 1949), aff'd sub. nom.; Washington v.
McGrath, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 923
(1951).
47. Many of the functions served by the right to petition have been taken over by
the more modem or efficient modes of communication - the press and broadcasting. 17
ENcYc.oPErA B=RATeCA 648-49 (1957); see generally, 'Petition,' Coanvn, TnE CoN-
sI o" AND WHAT Iv MEAws TODAY 203-04 (Atheneum ed. 1963). Few modem cases
involve the right to petition as a central problem, and judicial discussion is general and
little-considered. See National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. McGrath, 103 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D.D.C.
1952).
48. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Id. at 279-80, 283.
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and mal-administration within the government, airing grievances and alleged
injustices associated with the executive department, and recommending reme-
dial measures and policy changes.60 Most importantly, the substantive rule
established in the New York Times case - that only malicious statements are
actionable - is strikingly similar to the limits found in the few extant cases
discussing the right to petition.', Although there are only several early state
cases on point, and although these cases did not clearly identify the source
of the right to petition which they defined - federal constitution, state con-
stitution or common law - these opinions generally held that the public offi-
cials criticized in the petitions could maintain a libel or slander action only if
the statements were demonstrably malicious.
52
If section 652(d) is interpreted to protect all but malicious statements,
then the statutory right would seemingly be rendered at least co-extensive
with the constitutional right to petition. Indeed, the Constitution, in a case
involving executive discipline based on the contents of employee petitions,
might offer less protection than the malice standard. In the Times case the
interest in speech was stronger and the interests opposed to speech of less
weight than in the Turner situation. In New York Times the very core of the
first amendment right of expression, the right to engage fully in public debate,
was at stake ;538 and the interest in protecting public officials from libel involved
there would seem entitled to less weight than the administrative and disciplinary
50. See sources cited in notes 45, 47 supra. Rep. Slade in 1840 noted that the right to
petition possesses a "moral influence," awakens "the consciousness of responsibility ...
in the representative body" and that "it is a standing constitutional medium of communi-
cation from the People to their Representatives." SLADE, SPEECH ON THE RIGHT TO PETrToN
6 (1840). Similar statements may be made about the role of the press today. For a more
balanced approach toward the role of mass communication media see PowEL, PERSONNEL
ADtmNisTRATIox iw GovERNMENT 62-64 (1956).
51. The standard is variously phrased in these cases. See, e.g., Gray v. Pentland, 2
S. & R. 23 (Pa. 1815), holding statements to be immune if "not in malice, and not without
probable cause" (Tilghman, C. J., id. at 30) or if not "wanton and malicious, and without
probable cause" (Yeates, J. id. at 33); Howard v. Thompson, 21 Wend. 319 (N.Y. 1839)
holding plaintiff must show both malice and want of probable cause for the statements,
to successfully maintain a malicious prosecution action. See also Reid v. Delorme, 2 S.C,
(2 Brev.) 76, 79 (1806); Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 380 (1825).
52. The reasons for the requirement that plaintiff must prove express malice or "that
the petition was entirely false, malicious and groundless" were stated in Thorn v. Blan-
chard, 5 Johns. R. 508, 529-30 (N.Y. 1809):
The freedom of inquiry, the right of exposing malversation in public men and public
institutions to the proper authority, the importance of punishing offences, and the
danger of silencing inquiry and of affording impunity to guilt, have all combined
to shut the door against prosecutions for libels, in cases of that, or of an analogous
nature.
And see Harris v. Huntington, 2 Ver. (2 Tyler) 129, 140 (1802):
An absolute and unqualified indemnity from all responsibility in the petitioner is
indispensable, from the right of petitioning the supreme power for the redress of
grievances; for it would be an absurd mockery in a government to hold out this
privilege to its subjects, and then punish them for the use of it.
See also O'Donaghue v. McGovern 23 Wend. 26 (N.Y. 1840).
53. 376 U.S. at 292, 269-83. See Kalvin, The New York Times Case: A Note oh "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SuPREmE CT. Rzv. 191, 204-10.
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needs of the government in Turner. Previous adjudication involving the civil
service, exemplified by the Hatch Act cases,r4 indicates that the constitutional
balance in the Turner situation might swing more strongly against the indi-
vidual right of expression. Thus the Constitution would probably exact no
more - and possibly a good deal less - in Turner than it did in New York
Times, and if section 652(d) is read to embody a malice standard, the con-
stitutional issues potentially involved in the application of the statute would
be successfully avoided.
Rather than adopting a test based on malice, the Commission and the courts
in Turner utilized the standard of "false, untrue or made irresponsibly" or
"without reasonable basis of belief."55 This interpretation of Section 652(d)
may not provide enough protection to the right of petition to avoid the con-
stitutional morass. Given the likelihood that the constitutional standard ap-
proaches the test of New York Times, the Civil Service Commission's nar-
rower reading of section 652(d) may well necessitate difficult adjudication
in the constitutional penumbra surrounding the statute. Aside from the failure
of the Commission's standard to avoid the potential constitutional issue, its
basic flaw is that it does not indicate awareness that in passing section 652(d)
Congress deliberately and consciously struck a balance between the competing
interests at stake. Section 652(d) dearly favors the interest of government
employees in being able to air complaints and to seek remedies for job griev-
ances and the interest of Congress in obtaining first-hand information on
personnel problems in the civil service, at the expense of the executive branch's
ability to maintain efficiency, discipline and morale by acting on the contents
of employee petitions.56
54. See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). The Court in
Mitchell refrained from talking in terms of "privilege." Instead, it used a balancing test
and upheld the Hatch Act prohibition against active partisan political activity by public
employees. Id. at 96. Mr. Justice Black's dissent argued that the act was unconstitutional
because it violated the right to petition, as well as the freedom of speech, press and
assembly. Id. at 111.
The Hatch Act has been interpreted by the Civil Service Commission to forbid public
employees from initiating petitions or canvassing for signatures "if such petitions are
identified with political management or political campaigns." This is aimed at partisan,
organized political activity along party lines. UxTED STATES CIVIL SvavrcE Co si ;ss0,
Pora-TcAL Acnvrry AxM PoLrrcAr. AssEssrmNrs or FEDmEAL OmcmnoD s Ai mMr-
PLOyEES 13 (1944). See also U.S. Crvm. SRvrcE Couenz., HATCH Acr DEasions 43
(1949), including the following cases: In Matter of Herbert S. Reed, Fed. Docket No.
1204, at 206-09, Aug. 4, 1947; In Matter of John F. Hahn, Fed. Docket No. 1013, at 86,
89, Oct. 10, 1941; In Matter of Michael LoPresti, Fed. Docket No. 1151, at 216, 219,
Jan. 29, 1947. The Hatch Act does not appear to effect the right to petition for redress
of job grievances protected by § 652(d), but is limited to organized party-oriented political
activities, e.g., nominating petitions. See Wilson v. United States Civil Service Comm'n,
136 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1955). Problems of interpreting the Hatch Act are examined
in Rose, A Critical Look at the Hatch Act, 75 HAv. L. REv. 510 (1962).
55. See notes 8-9, 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
56. The wisdom of the Congressional balance might be challenged by some commen-
tators in the public personnel administration field who assert that removal powers should
be broad and that "open back door firing" should be permitted. Van Riper, Adapting a
British Political Invention to American Needs, 31 Pursuc ArNisnnAseozi 317 (1953).
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The Commission's standard allows removal of an employee on the ground
that his statements were "made irresponsibly" or "without reasonable basis
of belief," even if upon examination they are demonstrated to be true. If the
executive department is thus to judge "irresponsibility" without a truth de-
fense, the right to petition is not accorded substantial protection 7 As the
second charge in Turner may illustrate, virtually any criticism of an executive
department can be characterized as demonstrating a lack of loyalty or a lack
of good judgment and hence as "irresponsible." Secondly, the Turner standard
can be satisfied merely by a demonstration of the falsity of statements in a pe-
tition. This alternative test, too, affords little insulation to the right to petition,
Congressional intent to broaden employee rights of speech and to destroy the
"gag rule" is inconsistent with a standard which permits removal on the
basis of statements which, though later demonstrated to be false, may have
been made in good faith and without any intention to mislead. The fear of a
"subsequent audit" in which statements made in petitions must be justified
against a retrospectively applied truth standard would act as a strong deterrent
against exercise of section 652(d) rights; it would, in effect, compel aggrieved
employees to engage in a form of self-censorship not as visible as, but perhaps
no less constricting than the overt prior censorship authorized by the old gag
rule.58 In view of the traditional judicial reluctance to re-examine administra-
tive dismissal proceedings,59 the absence of a right to appeal from the agency to
the Civil Service Commission and from the Commission directly to the courts,60
Under this view, any involvement of Congress creates disturbing effects of "political In-
fluence" due to the "tendency of some legislators to meddle in the internal management
of executive departments," and the "executive branch, if it is to be held responsible for
administration, must alone exercise authority in such matters as discipline, removal and
advancement." MOSHER, KINGSLEY & STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION, 58-59
(3d ed. 1950). In practice, the administrator does not possess as much power as these
experts would prefer. PowEuL, PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION rN GOVERNMENT, 312-14 (1956).
But see Hearings, House Committee on the Civil Service 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 59 (1940)
testimony of Jacob Baker of United Federal Workers on the need to appeal to Congress)-
id. at 5 (remarks of Rep. Randolph on Congress acting as "board of appeals" for employee
grievances.)
57. See note 66 infra for a comparison of the malice and the irresponsibility standard
with regard to the absence of a truth defense.
58. Compare the discussion of self-censorship in the New York Times case, 376 U.S.
at 278-80. See Kalven, op. cit. supra note 53, at 210-13.
59. The extent of court review is usually limited to whether the statutory and regu-
latory procedures were observed, and whether the challenged action was arbitrary, ca-
pricious or was supported by evidence. Pelicone v. Hodges, 320 F2d 754, 755 (D.C. Cir.
1963) ; Hargett v. Summerfield, 243 F.2d 29, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1957). See KAPLAN, Tur LAW
OF CrviL SERVICE 251-52 (1958) for a strict interpretation of review of Section 652 dis-
missals.
60. Section 652, governing removal generally from the classified Civil Service for
"such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service," does not provide for a right
of appeal from the administrator's action to the Commission. The Commission hears
appeals of dismissals allegedly based on political reasons or discrimination on account of
sex, marital status or physical handicap. See 5 U.S.C. § 633(2) (5,6,9) (1958) ; 5 C.F.R.
§§ 5.4(c), 315.806 (1964). Turner, however, as a veteran, had a right to appeal his dis-
missal to the Civil Service Commission under section 14 of the Veterans Preference Act.
5 U.S.C. § 863 (1958).
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and the expense of pressing separate legal proceedings to vindicate section
652(d) rights, the Civil Service Commission standard would, in effect, leave
executive agencies a great and unreviewable range of discretion in disciplinary
matters involving the right to petition approaching the discretion enjoyed under
the gag rule. This wide discretion magnifies the danger that retaliation might
be meted out for the act of petitioning, rather than because of the irresponsi-
bility or falsity of statements contained in the petition.
It might be argued that the Commission's standard, and wide discretion in
interpreting and applying it, are necessary to protect the government's interest
in maintaining efficiency, morale, loyalty and effective discipline. Thus, the
government might argue that the contents of employee petitions are useful in
evaluating the temperament, character and job fitness of the petitioner, and
that insulating petitions from administrative examination will unduly hamper
efforts to remove undesirable personnel. This position, however, is not per-
suasive in view of the fact that the government still possesses other methods
for dealing with incompetent or insubordinate employees - for example, per-
formance ratings and the power to transfer.6' This is not to say that the execu-
tive should be able to utilize other forms of discipline as a guise for punishing
those who have petitioned, but that generally troublesome employees who
happen to have petitioned will not be immunized from discipline based on
other conduct. If the only complaint that can be advanced against an employee
is that he wrote a letter to his Congressman which contained statements later
said to be false or irresponsible, the government's claim that this act con-
clusively demonstrates his unfitness appears open to serious doubt. The execu-
tive departments might further contend that circulation of, or publicity stem-
ming from, job grievance petitions will undermine morale within the affected
executive department. But this argument also fails to take account of several
factors. Grievances may exist and be circulated within the department in-
formally even if no petition is drafted. Moreover, inhibiting the airing of com-
plaints may be more harmful to employee attitudes than permitting the circu-
lation of a petition, especially in light of the already extensive limitations on
the means of expression available to public employees. °s Similarly, vth re-
spect to discipline and loyalty, the government might argue that going over
department heads and utilizing external channels for grieving may impair
harmony and efficiency within the department, and that the availability of
internal grievance procedures makes external appeals superfluous.03 On the
other hand, the employee's utilization of extra-departmental forums for pressing
his complaint may be a last resort indicating that internal grievance procedures
Neither the Veteran's Preference sections nor those applying to the civil service gen-
erally provide for appeals to the courts on administrative or civil service commission
action. Turner brought his case before the District Court pleading federal question juris-
diction and seeking declaratory judgment See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201 (1958).
61. See generally Powmx, PEmSONIxmE A unrnsAToN u" Govinmmrr 3M0-90
(1956).
62. On Hatch Act limitations see note 54 supra. The Taft-Hartley prohibition against
public service employee strikes is also relevant.
63. See Pow=, op. cit. supra note 61 at 310-11.
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are inadequate or non-existent." Nor does the making of an external appeal
necessarily demonstrate an employee's disloyalty to the department; for ex-
ample, Turner may well have felt that his criticisms would ultimately lead to
reforms, otherwise unobtainable, which would improve the FBI. Severely
restricting the right to petition granted by section 652(d) may thus fore-
close the employee's only effective opportunity to present complaints and to
redress grievances. In sum, the government's possible arguments for a narrow
construction of section 652(d), while entitled to some consideration, do not
appear sufficiently convincing to outweigh the factors which should lead a court
to a broad statutory interpretation: the anti-executive tenor of the legislative
debates, the apparent failure of the Commission standard to guarantee effective
protection to the employee's right to petition 0 and the desire to avoid facing
unnecessary constitutional issues.
The malice standard suggested by Judge Fahy in his Tierner dissent - that
the statute protects all statements except those knowingly false or made with
"reckless disregard of whether false or not" 60 - represents a better adjustment
of the interests at stake, and a more accurate expression of the policies that
motivated the enactment of section 652(d). Wide protection is given to em-
ployee communication to Congress, and the dangers of executive censorship
and retaliation are minimized. Good faith complaints by government employees
will not be deterred out of fear that their statements can later be shown to
have been false or irresponsible; the malice standard, in effect, eliminates
the self-censorship problem. Moreover, the standard does give some recogni-
tion to the executive interest in maintaining efficiency, morale and discipline.07
Deliberate lying and malicious accusations - which represent a distinctly
more serious challenge to executive authority than carelessly made or un-
knowingly false statements - can be punished. Finally, incorporating the
malice standard into section 652(d) will sufficiently protect the right to pe-
tition so that a court should not have to resort to constitutional exegesis in a
virtually unchartered area of first amendment doctrine.
64. Id. at 307-10.
65. See note 57-60 supra and accompanying text.
66. Properly interpreted, this "reckless disregard" component of the malice standard
requires a much greater quantum of proof than the "Irresponsible" standard applied by
the Civil Service Commission. The distinction is analogous to the familiar tort law dis-
tinction betveen negligence and recklessness, the former being, generally, merely careless-
ness, and the latter involving a degree of culpability akin to "guilty." The "reckless dis-
regard" standard is simply a shorthand phrase for indicating the requirement that malicious
intent be shown adequately by external evidence. The absence of a truth defense is tolerable
-where positive proof of malicious intent is required; once such a state of mind inconsistent
with effective continued employment is shown, the truth of the statement is no longer
crucial. Where the government used the "irresponsibility" standard, however, and thus
required only a showing of carelessness or thoughtlessness in the making of the statement,
the absence of a truth defense meant a curtailment of expression inconsistent with the
purposes of § 652(d).
67. The adoption of a more liberal standard does not mean that reasonable regulation
of security information could not be enforced. Once the scope of "security" is defined,
and it is demonstrated that classified information has been transmitted, removal would
clearly be allowed. The problems of security information are beyond the scope of this Note.
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